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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN INDIAN COUNTRY: SOUTH
DAKOTA, A CASE STUDY
Laughlin McDonald
The problems that Indians continue to experience in South Dakota in securing
an equal right to vote strongly support the extension of the special provisions of
the Voting Rights Act scheduled to expire in 2007. They also demonstrate the
ultimate wisdom of Congress in making permanent and nationwide the basic
guarantee of equal political participation contained in the act.'
L South Dakota's Refusal to Comply with Section 5
Ten years after its enactment in 1965, Congress amended the Voting Rights
Act to include American Indians, to expand the geographic reach of the special
preclearance provisions of Section 5, and to require certain jurisdictions to
provide bilingual election materials to language minorities. As a result of the
amendments, Shannon and Todd Counties in South Dakota, home to the Pine
Ridge and Rosebud Indian Reservations respectively, became subject to
preclearance.2 Further, eight counties in the state, because of their significant
Indian populations, were required to conduct bilingual elections - Todd,
Shannon, Bennett, Charles Mix, Corson, Lyman, Mellette, and Washabaugh.3
William Janklow, at that time Attorney General of South Dakota, was
outraged over the extension of Section 5 and the bilingual election requirement
to his state. In a formal opinion addressed to the Secretary of State, he derided
the 1975 law as a "facial absurdity." Borrowing the states' rights rhetoric of
southern politicians who opposed the modern civil rights movement, he
condemned the Voting Rights Act as an unconstitutional federal encroachment
that rendered state power "almost meaningless." He quoted with approval
Justice Hugo Black's famous dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,4 arguing
that Section 5 treated covered jurisdictions as "little more than conquered
* Director, Voting Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Atlanta,
Georgia. B.A. 1960, Columbia University; LL.B. 1965, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. The permanent provisions of the act and the special provisions scheduled to expire in
2007 are set out in the attached addendum.
2. 41 Fed. Reg. 784 (Jan. 5, 1976).
3. 41 Fed. Reg. 30,002 (July 20, 1976).
4. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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provinces." 5 Janidow expressed hope that Congress would soon repeal "the
Voting Rights Act currently plaguing South Dakota." In the meantime, he
advised the Secretary of State not to comply with the preclearance requirement.
"I see no need," he said, "to proceed with undue speed to subject our State's laws
to a 'one-man veto' by the United States Attorney General."6
Although the 1975 amendments were never in fact repealed, state officials
followed Janklow's advice and essentially ignored the preclearance requirement.
From the date of its official coverage in 1976 until 2002, South Dakota enacted
more than six hundred statutes and regulations having an effect on elections or
voting in Shannon and Todd Counties, but submitted fewer than ten for
preclearance.
II. How the Special Provisions Work
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a complex, interlocking set of permanent
provisions that applied nationwide, along with special provisions that applied
only in jurisdictions that had used a "test or devise" for voting and in which
registration and voting were depressed. The most controversial of the special
provisions was Section 5,7 which covered most of the South where
discrimination against blacks in voting had been most persistent and flagrant.
Section 5 requires "covered" jurisdictions to preclear any changes in their
voting practices or procedures and prove that they do not have a discriminatory,
or retrogressive, purpose or effect. A voting change is deemed to be
retrogressive if it diminishes the "effective exercise" of minority political
participation compared to the preexisting practice.8 Preclearance can be
obtained by making an administrative submission to the Attorney General or by
bringing a declaratory judgment action in the federal court in the District of
Columbia. The purpose of the preclearance requirement, as explained by the
Supreme Court, was "to shift the advantages of time and inertia from the
perpetrators of the evil [of discrimination in voting] to its victims." 9 The
majority of the Supreme Court acknowledged that Section 5 was an uncommon
exercise of congressional power, but found that it was justified by the "insidious
and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country
through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.""°
5. Id. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting).
6. 77 S.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 175 (1977).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
8. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 151 (1976).
9. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
10. Id. at 309.
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The 1975 amendments extended the protections of the act to "language
minorities," defined as American Indians, Asian-Americans, Alaskan Natives,
and persons of Spanish Heritage." The amendments also expanded the
geographic coverage of Section 5 by including in the definition of a "test or
device" the use of English-only election materials in jurisdictions where more
than 5% of the voting age citizen population was comprised of a single-language
minority group. 2 As a result of this new definition, the preclearance
requirement was extended to counties in California, Florida, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New York, South Dakota, and the State of Texas. 3
The 1975 amendments also required certain states and political subdivisions
to provide voting materials in languages other than English. 4 While there are
several tests for "coverage," the requirement is imposed upon jurisdictions with
significant language minority populations who are limited-English proficient and
where the illiteracy rate of the language minority is higher than the national
illiteracy rate. Covered jurisdictions are required to furnish voting materials in
the language of the applicable minority group as well as in English.
Jurisdictions covered by the bilingual election requirement include the entire
states of California, New Mexico, and Texas, and several hundred counties and
townships in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
and Washington."
Indians, as a "cognizable racial group," were undoubtedly already covered by
the permanent provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of "race or color."' 16 In a 1955 decision, for example,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that an Indian would be entitled to the
protection of a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race or
color."' 7 In a variety of contexts, courts have held that Indians were a racial
group entitled to the protection of the constitution and federal civil rights laws,
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(e) (2000).
12. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. C.C.A.N. 774, 775.
13. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. (1990).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la.
15. 28 C.F.R. pt. 55, app. (1990).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
17. Rice v. Sioux City Mem'il Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 76 (1955).
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e.g., in legislative redistricting,"8 injury selection,"' in employment,2" in public
education,2 in access to services,22 etc. In addition, a number of jurisdictions
which had substantial Native American populations were covered by the special
preclearance provisions of the 1965 act, including the State of Alaska and four
counties in Arizona.23  The 1975 amendments, however, expanded the
geographic reach of Section 5 and made the coverage of Indians explicit.
III. The Reasons for Extending Coverage
During hearings on the 1975 amendments, Rep. Peter Rodino, chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, said that members of language minority groups,
including American Indians, related "instances of discriminatory plans,
discriminatory annexations, and acts of physical and economic intimidation."'24
According to Rodino, "[t]he entire situation of these uncovered jurisdictions is
tragically reminiscent of the earlier and, in some respects, current problems
experienced by blacks in currently covered areas. '25 Rep. Robert Drinan noted
similarly during the floor debate that there was "evidence that American Indians
do suffer from extensive infringement of their voting rights," and that the
Department of Justice "has been involved in thirty-three cases involving
discrimination against Indians since 1970. ",26 House members also took note of
various court decisions documenting voting discrimination against Native
18. Klahr v. Williams, 339 F. Supp. 922,927 (D. Ariz. 1972); Goodluck v. Apache County,
417 F. Supp. 13 (D. Ariz. 1975).
19. United States v. Iron Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1999).
20. Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, Okla., 660 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1981).
21. Natonabah v. Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 724 (D. N. Mex. 1973).
22. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. Three counties in Arizona- Apache, Navajo, and Coconino - were allowed to "bail
out" from Section 5 coverage after the court concluded that the state's literacy test had not been
discriminatorily applied against American Indians. Apache County v. United States, 256 F.
Supp. 903, 913 (D.D.C. 1966). The state of Alaska, with its substantial Alaskan Native
population, was also allowed to bail out and for similar reasons. Alaska v. United States, No.
101-66 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 1966). As a result of subsequent amendments to the act, both Alaska
and Arizona were "recaptured" by Section 5.
24. 121 CONG. REC. 16,244 (1975) (statement by Rep. Rodino).
25. Id.
26. 121 CONG. REC. 16,262 (1975) (statement of Rep. Drinan).
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Americans, including Klahr v. Williams,27 Oregon v. Mitchell,2" and Goodluck
v. Apache County.29
The House report that accompanied the 1975 amendments of the Act found
"a close and direct correlation between high illiteracy among [language
minority] groups and low voter participation."3 The illiteracy rate among
American Indians was 15.5%, compared to a nationwide illiteracy rate of only
4.5% for Anglos. The report concluded that these disparities were "the product
of the failure of state and local officials to offer equal educational opportunities
to members of language minority groups. "31
During debate in the Senate, Senator William Scott read into the record a
report prepared by the Library of Congress, "Prejudice and Discrimination in
American History," which concluded that:
Discrimination of the most basic kind has been directed against the
American Indian from the day that settlers from Europe set foot upon
American shores .... [A]s late as 1948 certain Indians were still
refused the right to vote. The resulting distress of Indians is as
severe as that of any group discriminated against in American
society.32
Discrimination against Indians has not only been severe, it has been unique.
Even during the days of slavery, blacks, who were regarded as valuable
property, were never subjected to the kind of extermination policies that were
often visited upon tribal members in the West.33
The first laws enacted by the Dakota Territory involving Indians were
distinctly racist. They praised the "indomitable spirit of the Anglo-Saxon," and
27. Klahr, 339 F. Supp. at 927 (finding that legislative redistricting in Arizona had been
adopted for the purpose of diluting Indian voting strength), cited in Extension of the Voting
Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., app. at 1225-30 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings].
28. 400 U.S. 112, 147 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that literacy "tests have been
used at times as a discriminatory weapon against... American Indians"), cited in 121 CONG.
REC. 16,245 (1975) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
29. Goodluck, 417 F. Supp. at 14 (finding that a county redistricting plan had been adopted
to diminish Indian voting strength), cited in 1975 House Hearings, supra note 27, app. at 1225-
30; 121 CONG. REC. 16,250 (1975) (statement of Rep. Young).
30. H. REP. No. 94-196, at 30 (1975).
31. Id.
32. 121 CONG. REC. 13,603 (1975) (statement of Sen. Scott).
33. This bleak chapter in American history has been recounted in many places, including
in DEE ALEXANDER BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OFTHE
AMERICAN WEST (1970).
No. 1]
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described Indians as "red children" and the "poor child" of the prairie.34 Four
years later, the legislature described Indians as the "revengeful and murderous
savage."35
Territorial laws (and later state laws) restricted voting and office-holding to
free white males and citizens of the United States.36 Indians who sustained tribal
relations, received support from the government, or held untaxable land were
prohibited from voting in any state election.37 The establishment of precincts on
Indian reservations was forbidden,38 and as election judges and clerks were
required to have the "qualifications of electors," Indians were effectively denied
the right to serve as election officials.39
South Dakota discriminated against Indians in a variety of other ways.
Indians were prohibited from entering ceded lands without a permit.4° It was a
crime to harbor or keep on one's premises or within any village settlement of
white people any reservation Indians "who have not adopted the manners and
habits of civilized life."'"
Jury service was restricted to "free white males." '42 The "intermarriage of
white persons with persons of color" was prohibited.43 Further, it was a crime
to provide instruction in any language other than English."
South Dakota also played a leading role in breaking various treaties between
tribes and the United States. The legislature sent a stream of resolutions and
memorials to Congress urging it to extinguish Indian title to land and remove the
Indians to make way for white settlement. In 1862, it asked Congress to
34. 1862 Dakota Terr. Laws Preface.
35. Memorial and Joint Resolution Regarding the Appointment of an Indian Agent, ch. 38,
1866 Dakota Terr. Laws 551.
36. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 14, 1864, ch. 19, 1864 Dakota Terr. Laws 51; Civil Code § 26,
1866 Dakota Terr. Laws 1, 4 (providing that Indians cannot vote or hold office); Act of Mar.
8, 1890, ch. 45, 1890 S.D. Laws 118.
37. Act of Mar. 8, 1890, ch. 45, 1890 S.D. Laws 118.
38. Act of Mar. 12, 1895, ch. 84, 1895 Dakota Terr. Laws 88.
39. Dakota Terr. Comp. L. §§ 1442-1443 (1887).
40. Act to Prevent Indians From Trespassing on Ceded Lands, ch. 46, 1862 Dakota Terr.
Laws 319.
41. Act Prohibiting the Harboring of Indians Within the Organized Counties, ch. 19, 1866
Dakota Terr. Laws 482.
42. Act Respecting Jurors, ch. 52, 1862 Dakota Ter. Laws 374; see also Act of Mar. 5,
1901, ch. 168, 1901 S.D. Laws 270 (providing for the selection of jurors from tax lists).
43. Act Regulating Marriages, ch. 59, 1862 Dakota Terr. Laws 390; see also Act of Mar.
14, 1913, ch. 226, 1913 S.D. Laws 406 (prohibiting the "intermarriage, or illicit cohabitation"
of members of the white and colored races).
44. Act of Mar. 11, 1921, ch. 203, 1921 S.D. Laws 307.
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extinguish title "to the country now claimed and occupied by the Brule Sioux
Indians, '45 and to extinguish title to land occupied by the Chippewa Indians.'
Four years later, it requested the Secretary of War to establish a military post to
protect "the colonization of the Black Hills. 47 In 1868, it proposed the removal
of Dakota Indians and exclusion from "habitation of the Indians that portion of
Dakota known as the Black Hills."48 On December 31, 1870, it renewed its
request for the removal of Chippewa Indians from ceded lands.49 In 1873, it
again asked Congress to open Indian lands, including the Black Hills, to white
settlement.50 As a result of the intense pressure from the territorial government
and white miners and settlers, and the United States's capitulation to it, the Black
Hills and other traditional tribal lands were finally taken from the Indians.5 The
Supreme Court, commenting on the expropriation of the Black Hills from the
Sioux in 1877, said that "[a] more ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealing
will never, in all probability, be found in our history."52 Shortly after the turn
of the century, South Dakota, by then a state, asked Congress to open portions
of the Rosebud Reservation to white settlement.53
Despite passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 192 4 ,' which granted full
rights of citizenship to Indians, South Dakota officially excluded Indians from
voting and holding office until the 1940s.55 Even after the repeal of state law
denying Indians the right to vote, as late as 1975 the state prohibited Indians
from voting in elections in counties that were "unorganized" under state law.'
The three unorganized counties were Todd, Shannon, and Washabaugh, whose
residents were overwhelmingly Indian. The state also prohibited residents of the
unorganized counties from holding county office until as late as 1980.57
45. Memorial and Joint Resolution Regarding the Brule Sioux Indians, ch. 99, 1862 Dakota
Terr. Laws 503.
46. Memorial to Congress Regarding the Chippewa Indians, ch. 100, 1862 Dakota Terr.
Laws 505.
47. Memorial to the Secretary of War, ch. 50, 1866 Dakota Terr. Laws 566.
48. Memorial and Joint Resolution Regarding Indian Affairs, 1867 Dakota Terr. Laws 275.
49. Memorial to the President, 1870 Dakota Terr. Laws 585.
50. Memorial to the Congress, 1872 Dakota Tern. Laws 204.
51. BROWN, supra note 33, at 269.
52. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 387 (1980).
53. House Joint Resolution 6, ch. 147, 1901 S.D. Laws 248.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (2000).
55. Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1986).
56. Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253, 1255-57 (8th Cir. 1975).
57. United States v. South Dakota, 636 F.2d 241, 244-45 (8th Cir. 1980).
No. 1]
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For most of the twentieth century, voters were required to register in person
at the office of the county auditor.58 Getting to the county seat was a hardship for
Indians who lacked transportation, particularly for those in unorganized counties
who were required to travel to another county to register. Moreover, state law
did not allow the auditor to appoint a tribal official as a deputy to register Indian
voters in their own communities.59 There was one exception, however. State
law required the tax assessor to register property owners in the course of
assessing the value of their land. Thus, taxpayers were automatically registered
to vote, while nontaxpayers, many of whom were Indian, were required to make
the trip to the courthouse to register in person. 60 Mail-in registration was not
fully implemented in South Dakota until 197361
IV. Depressed Socioeconomic Status and Reduced Political Participation
One of the many legacies of discrimination against Indians is a severely
depressed socioeconomic status. According to the 2000 census, the
unemployment rate for Indians in South Dakota was 23.6%, compared to 3.2%
for whites.62 Unemployment rates on the reservations were even higher. In
1997, the unemployment rate on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation was
80%. At the Standing Rock Indian Reservation it was 74%.63 The average life
expectancy of Indians is shorter than that of other Americans. According to a
report drafted by the South Dakota Advisory Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, "Indian men in South Dakota ... usually live only
into their mid-50s. '64 Infant mortality in Indian Country "is double the national
average. ,
65
Native Americans experience a poverty rate that is five times the poverty rate
for whites. The 2000 census reported that 48.1% of Indians in South Dakota
were living below the poverty line, compared to 9.7% of whites. Sixty-one
percent of Native American households received incomes below $20,000,
58. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 16.0701-.0706 (Michie 1939).
59. 1963-1964 S.D. ATr'YGEN. BIENNIAL REP. 341.
60. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1024 (D.S.D. 2004).
61. Act of Mar. 27, 1973, ch. 70, 1973 S.D. Laws 111.
62. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, SOUTH DAKOTA: 2000: CENSUS 2000
SUMMARY FILE 3 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 3].
63. SOUTH DAKOTA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVl. RIGHTS, NATIVE
AMERICANS IN SOUTH DAKOTA: AN EROSION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2000)
[hereinafter S.D. ADVISORY COMM. REPORT (2000)].
64. id.
65. Id. at 6-7.
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compared to 24.4% of white households. The per capita income of Indians was
$6,799 compared to $28,837 for whites.'
Of Native Americans twenty-five years of age and over, 29% have not
finished high school, while 14% of whites are without a high school diploma.
The drop-out rate among Indians aged sixteen through nineteen is 24%, four
times the drop-out rate for whites. Nearly one-fourth of Indian households live
in crowded conditions, compared to 1.6% for whites. Approximately 21% of
Indian households lack telephones, compared to 1.2% of white households.
Native American households are three times as likely as white households to be
without access to vehicles; 17.9% of Native American households are without
access to vehicles versus 5.4% of white households.67
The link between depressed socioeconomic status and reduced political
participation is direct. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "political
participation tends to be depressed where minority group members suffer effects
of prior discrimination such as inferior education, poor employment
opportunities, and low incomes. 68  Numerous appellate and trial court
decisions, including those from Indian country, are to the same effect.
In a case from South Dakota involving the Sisseton Independent School
District, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[1]ow
political participation is one of the effects of past discrimination."'69 Similarly,
in a case involving tribal members in Thurston County, Nebraska, the court held
that "disparate socio-economic status is causally connected to Native
Americans' depressed level of political participation. ' 7' Finally, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "lower... social and economic factors
hinder the ability of American Indians in Montana to participate fully in the
political process.",
71
Given the socioeconomic status of Indians in South Dakota, it is not
surprising that their voter registration and political participation have been
severely depressed. As late as 1985, only 9.9% of Indians in the state were
66. U.S. CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 3, supra note 62.
67. Id.
68. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 69 (1986).
69. Buckanaga, 804 F.2d at 475.
70. Stabler v. County of Thurston, 129 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 1997).
71. Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.3d 1113, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); accord Windy Boy v.
County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1016-017 (D. Mont. 1986) ("Reduced participation and
reduced effective participation of Indians in local politics can be explained by many factors...
but the lingering effects of past discrimination is certainly one of those factors.").
No. 1]
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72registered to vote. The South Dakota Advisory Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights soberly concluded in a 2000 report that:
For the most part, Native Americans are very much separate and
unequal members of society ... [who] do not fully participate in
local, State, and Federal elections. This absence from the electoral
process results in a lack of political representation at all levels of
government and helps to ensure the continued neglect and
inattention to issues of disparity and inequality.73
V. Indian Voting Rights Litigation
Despite the application of the Voting Rights Act to Indians, both in its
enactment in 1965 and extension in 1975, relatively little litigation to enforce
the Act, or the constitution, was brought on behalf of Indian voters in the West
until fairly recently. Indian country was largely bypassed by the extensive
voting rights litigation campaign that was waged elsewhere, particularly in the
South, after the amendment of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to
incorporate a discriminatory "results" standard.74
Section 2, one of the original provisions of the 1965 Act, was a permanent,
nationwide prohibition on the use of voting practices or procedures that "deny
or abridge" the right to vote on the basis of race or color. The Supreme Court
subsequently held in Mobile v. Bolden75 that proof of a discriminatory purpose,
as was the case for a constitutional violation, was also required for a violation
of Section 2. Two years later Congress responded to Mobile v. Bolden by
amending Section 2 and dispensing with the requirement of proving that a
challenged practice was enacted, or was being maintained, with a discriminatory
purpose.76 Congress also made explicit that Section 2 protected the equal right
of minorities "to elect representatives of their choice."
The Supreme Court construed Section 2 for the first time in Thornburg v.
Gingles,77 and simplified the test for proving a violation of the statute by
identifying three factors as most probative of minority vote dilution: geographic
compactness, political cohesion, and legally significant white bloc voting.7 The
72. Buckanaga, 804 F.2d at 474.
73. S.D. ADvISORY COMM. REPORT (2000), supra note 63, at 38-39.
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
75. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
76. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 36 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214.
77. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
78. Id. at 50-51.
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ultimate test under Section 2 is whether a challenged practice, based on the
totality of circumstances, "interacts with social and historical conditions to
create an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white
voters. ' 79 The amendment of Section 2 and Gingles were critical in facilitating
what has accurately been described as a "quiet revolution" in minority voting
rights and office holding.80
The lack of enforcement of the Voting Rights Act in Indian Country was the
result of a combination of factors. They included a lack of resources and access
to legal assistance by the Indian community, lax enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act by the Department of Justice, the isolation of the Indian community,
and the debilitating legacy of years of discrimination by the federal and state
governments.
The first challenge under amended Section 2 in South Dakota was brought in
1984 by members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe in Roberts and
Marshall Counties. Represented by the Native American Rights Fund, they
claimed that the at-large method of electing members of the board of education
of the Sisseton Independent School District diluted Indian voting strength. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed. It held that the trial court failed to consider "substantial
evidence.., that voting in the District was polarized along racial lines."'" The
trial court had also failed to discuss the "substantial" evidence of discrimination
against Indians in voting and office holding, the "substantial evidence regarding
the present social and economic disparities between Indians and whites,"82 the
discriminatory impact of staggered terms of office and apportioning "seats
between rural and urban members on the basis of registered voters "83 which
underrepresented Indians, and "the presence of only two polling places."' On
remand, the parties reached a settlement utilizing cumulative voting for the
election of school board members.85
79. Id. at 47; accord Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1012 (1994).
80. See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1249 (1989); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTs ACT 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
81. Buckanaga, 804 F.2d at 473.
82. Id. at 474.
83. Id. at 475.
84. Id. at 476.
85. See Jeanette Wolfley, Jim Crow, Indian Style: The Disenfranchisement of Native
Americans, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 167, 200 (1991); see also Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of
Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 872, 874 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (discussing cumulative voting).
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In 1986, Alberta Black Bull and other Indian residents of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation brought a successful Section 2 suit against Ziebach County
because of its failure to provide sufficient polling places for school district
elections.86 The same year, Indian plaintiffs on the reservation secured an order
requiring the auditor of Dewey County to provide Indians additional voter
registration cards and extend the deadline for voter registration. 7
Some thirteen years later, in 1999, the United States sued officials in Day
County for denying Indians the right to vote in elections for a sanitary district in
the area of Enemy Swim Lake and Campbell Slough. Under the challenged
scheme, only residents of several noncontiguous pieces of land owned by whites
could vote, while residents of the remaining 87% of the land around the two
lakes, which was owned by the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe and about two
hundred tribal members, were excluded from the electorate. In an agreement
settling the litigation, local officials admitted that Indians had been unlawfully
denied the right to vote, and agreed upon a new sanitation district that included
the Indian owned land around the two lakes.8
Steven Emery, Rocky Le Compte, and James Picotte, residents of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, and represented by the ACLU's Voting
Rights Project, filed suit in 2000 challenging the state's 1996 interim legislative
redistricting plan. In the 1970s, a special task force consisting of the nine tribal
chairs, four members of the legislature, and five lay people undertook a study of
Indian/state government relations. One of the staff reports of the commission
concluded that "[w]ith the present arrangement of legislative districts, Indian
people have had their voting potential in South Dakota diluted."8 9 The report
recommended the creation of a majority Indian district in the area of Shannon,
Washabaugh, Todd, and Bennett Counties.' Under the existing plan, there were
twenty-eight legislative districts, all of which were majority white and none of
which had ever elected an Indian.9 Thomas Short Bull, a member of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe and the executive director of the task force, said that the plan
gerrymandered the Rosebud and Pine Ridge Reservations by "divid[ing them]
into three legislative districts, effectively neutralizing the Indian vote in that
area."92 The legislature, however, ignored the task force's recommendation.
86. Black Bull v. Dupree Sch. Dist., No. 86-3012 (D.S.D. May 14, 1986).
87. Fiddler v. Sieker, No. 85-3050 (D.S.D. Oct. 24, 1986).
88. United States v. Day County, S.D., No. 99-1024 (D.S.D. June 16, 2000).
89. TASK FORCE ON INDIAN-STATE GOV'T RELATIONS, LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT AND
INDIAN VOTER POTENTIAL 17 (1974).
90. Id. at 25.
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According to Short Bull, "the state representatives and senators felt it was a
political hot potato .... [T]his was just too pro-Indian to take as an item of
action. '93
Prior to the 1980s round of redistricting, the South Dakota Advisory
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights made a similar
recommendation that the legislature create a majority Indian district in the area
of the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations. The Committee issued a report in
which it said that the existing districts "inherently discriminate against Native
Americans in South Dakota who might be able to elect one legislator in a single
member district."'94 The Department of Justice, pursuant to its oversight under
Section 5, advised the state that it would not preclear any legislative redistricting
plan that did not contain a majority Indian district in the Rosebud/Pine Ridge
area. The state bowed to the inevitable and in 1981 drew a redistricting plan
creating for the first time in the state's history a majority Indian district, District
28, which included Shannon and Todd Counties and half of Bennett County.95
Thomas Short Bull, an early proponent of equal voting rights for Indians, ran for
the senate the following year from District 28 and was elected, becoming the
first Indian ever to serve in the state's upper chamber.
The South Dakota legislature adopted a new redistricting plan in 1991 96 The
plan divided the state into thirty-five districts and provided, with one exception,
that each district would be entitled to one senate member and two house
members elected at-large from within the district. The exception was new
House District 28. The 1991 legislation provided that "in order to protect
minority voting rights, District No. 28 shall consist of two single-member house
districts." 97 District 28A consisted of Dewey and Ziebach Counties and portions
of Corson County, and included the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation and
portions of the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation. District 28B consisted of
Harding and Perkins Counties and portions of Corson and Butte Counties.
According to 1990 census data, Indians were 60% of the voting age population
(VAP) of House District 28A, and less than 4% of the VAP of House district
28B.
Five years later, despite its pledge to protect minority voting rights, the
legislature abolished House Districts 28A and 28B and required candidates for
93. Id.
94. REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 35, 52 (1981).
95. Bone Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
96. Act to Redistrict the Legislature, ch. 1, 1991 S.D. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1 (codified as
amended at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 2-2-24 through 2-2-31 (Michie 2000)).
97. Id. § 5, 1991 S.D. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1, 5.
No. 11
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
the House to run in District 28 at-large.98 Tellingly, the repeal took place after
an Indian candidate, Mark Van Norman, won the Democratic primary in District
28A in 1994. A chief sponsor of the repealing legislation was Eric Bogue, the
Republican candidate who defeated Van Norman in the general election."9 The
reconstituted House District 28 contained an Indian VAP of 29%. Given the
prevailing patterns of racially polarized voting, which members of the legislature
were surely aware of, Indian voters could not realistically expect to elect a
candidate of their choice in the new district.
The Emery plaintiffs claimed that the changes in District 28 violated Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act, as well as Article III, Section 5 of the South Dakota
Constitution. The state constitution provided that:
An apportionment shall be made by the Legislature in 1983 and in
1991, and every ten years after 1991. Such apportionment shall be
accomplished by December first of the year in which the
apportionment is required. If any Legislature whose duty it is to
make an apportionment shall fail to make the same as herein
provided, it shall be the duty of the Supreme Court within ninety
days to make such apportionment."
The constitution thus contained both an affirmative mandate and an implied
prohibition. It mandated reapportionment in 1983, 1991 and in every tenth year
thereafter, and it also prohibited all interstitial reapportionment. The South
Dakota Supreme Court had expressly held that "when a Legislature once makes
an apportionment following an enumeration no Legislature can make another
until after the next enumeration."'' 1 Any reapportionment that occurred outside
of the authority granted by the state Constitution was therefore invalid as a
matter of state law.' °2
Pronouncements by the South Dakota Legislative Research Council were to
the same effect. According to a 1995 memorandum prepared by the Council,
"[i]n the absence of a successful legal challenge, Article I1, section 5 of the
98. Act to Eliminate the Single-Member House Districts in District 28, ch. 21, 1996 S.D.
Laws 45 (amending S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-2-28 (Michie 2000)).
99. House State Affairs Comm., Minutes 5 (Jan. 29, 1996).
100. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5.
101. In re Legislative Reapportionment, 246 N.W. 295, 297 (S.D. 1933).
102. In re State Census, 62 N.W. 129, 130 (S.D. 1895). Other states have similar
constitutional provisions, and courts have interpreted them in the same way. See, e.g., Exon
v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 603,608 (D. Neb. 1967) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (interpreting
the Nebraska Constitution); Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1983) (per
curiam); In re Interrogatories, 536 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1975).
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South Dakota Constitution precludes any redistricting before 2001. '103 In
another memorandum prepared in 1998, the Council reiterated that "[u]nder the
provisions of Article 111, section 5, the Legislature is, however, restricted to
redistricting only once every ten years."" Despite the prohibitions of the state
constitution and the views of the research council, the legislature adopted the
mid-census plan abolishing majority Indian District 28A.
Dr. Steven Cole, an expert witness for the Emery plaintiffs, analyzed the six
legislative contests involving Indian and non-Indian candidates in District 28
held under the 1991 plan between 1992-1994 to determine the existence, and
extent, of any racial bloc voting. Indian voters favored the Indian candidates at
an average rate of 81%, while whites voted for the white candidates at an
average rate of 93%. In all six of the contests the candidate preferred by Indians
was defeated. I"5
Dr. Cole also analyzed one countywide contest involving an Indian candidate,
the 1992 general election for treasurer of Dewey County. Indian cohesion was
100%, white cohesion was 95%, and again the Indian-preferred candidate was
defeated. "°
There were five white-white legislative contests from 1992-1998, four of
which were head-to-head contests and one of which was a vote-for-two contest.
All of the contests showed significant levels of polarized voting. For the six
seats filled in the five contests, the candidates preferred by Indians lost four
times. Notably, the Indian-preferred white candidate(s) won only in majority
Indian District 28A. Schrempp, the white candidate, was preferred by Indian
voters in District 28A in the 1992 and 1996 general elections and won both
times. In the 1998 general election, however, he ran for state senate in District
28. Although he was again preferred by Indian voters, running in a district in
which Indians were 29% of the VAP, he lost. This sequence of elections
demonstrates in an obvious way the manner in which at-large elections in
District 28 dilute or submerge the voting strength of Indian voters. 107
103. SOUTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, ISSUE MEMORANDUM 95-36,
MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT AFTER MILLER V. JOHNSON
6 (1995).
104. SOUTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, ISSUE MEMORANDUM 98-12,
COMPARISON OF SINGLE MEMBER AND MULTIPLE MEMBER HOUSE DISTRICTS 5 (1998).
105. Emery v. Hunt, No. 00-3008 (D.S.D. 2000), Report of Steven P. Cole, at tbls. 1 & 2
[hereinafter Report of Steven Cole]. Dr. Cole used two standard techniques for determining the
existence of cohesion and racial bloc voting, bivariate ecological regression analysis (BERA)
and homogeneous precinct analysis.
106. Id.
107. Id. at tbl. 3.
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White cohesion also fluctuated widely depending on whether or not an Indian
was a candidate. In the four head-to-head white-white legislative contests,
where there was no possibility of electing an Indian candidate, the average level
of white cohesion was 68%. In the Indian-white legislative contests, the average
level of white cohesion jumped to 94%.'08 This phenomenon of increased white
cohesion to defeat minority candidates has been called "targeting," and
illustrates the way in which majority white districts operate to dilute minority
voting strength."°9
The vote-for-two election for the house in 1998, the first such election held
after the repeal of District 28A, also showed a remarkable divergence between
Indian and white voters. The candidate with the least amount of Indian support
(Wetz, with 8% of the Indian vote) got the highest amount of support from white
voters (70%). The candidate with the next lowest support from Indian voters
(Klaudt) received the second highest white support."'
The plaintiffs' Section 2 claim was strong. They met the basic requirements
set out in Gingles for proof of vote dilution: they were sufficiently
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district; they
were politically cohesive; and whites voted as a bloc usually to defeat the
candidates of their choice. In addition, other "totality of circumstances" factors
probative of vote dilution identified in Gingles and the senate report that
accompanied the 1982 amendments were present. Indians had a depressed
socioeconomic status. There was an extensive history of discrimination in the
state, including discrimination that impeded the ability of Indians to register and
otherwise participate in the political process. The history of Indian and white
relations in South Dakota was, in the words of the South Dakota Advisory
Committee, one of "broken treaties, and policies aimed at assimilation and
acculturation that severed Indians of their language, customs, and beliefs.""'
Voting was polarized. District 28 was also large, i.e., twice the size of District
28A, making it much more difficult for poorly financed Indian candidates to
campaign.
But before the Section 2 vote dilution claim could be heard, the district court
certified the state law question to the South Dakota Supreme Court. That court
108. Id. at tbls. 1 & 3.
109. See Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1994) ("When white bloc
voting is 'targeted' against black candidates, black voters are denied an opportunity enjoyed by
white voters, namely, the opportunity to elect a candidate of their own race."); RWTAAAC v.
Sundquist, 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 457 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (same), affd, 209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir.
2000).
110. Report of Steven Cole, supra note 105, at tbl. 3.
111. S.D. ADVISORY COMM. REPORT (2000), supra note 63, at ch. 3.
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accepted certification and held that in enacting the 1996 redistricting plan "the
Legislature acted beyond its constitutional limits."" 2 It declared the plan null
and void and reinstated the preexisting 1991 plan. At the ensuing special
election ordered by the district court, Tom Van Norman was elected from
District 28A, the first Indian in history to be elected to the state house from the
Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation.
Another Section 2 case was filed in March 2002 by Indian plaintiffs against
the at-large method of electing the board of education of the Wagner
Community School District in Charles Mix County. The parties eventually
agreed on a method of elections using cumulative voting to replace the at-large
system, and a consent decree was entered by the court on March 18, 2003.' ' At
the next election John Sully, an Indian, was elected to the board of education.
A similar Section 2 suit against the city of Martin is pending." 4
One of the most blatant schemes to disfranchise Indian voters was employed
in Buffalo County. The population of the county was approximately 2000
people, 83% of whom were Indian, and members primarily of the Crow Creek
Sioux Tribe. Under the plan for electing the three-member county commission,
which had been in effect for decades, nearly all of the Indian population - some
1500 people - were packed in one district. Whites, though only 17% of the
population, controlled the remaining two districts, and thus the county
government. The system, with its total deviation among districts of 218%, was
not only in violation of one person, one vote, but had clearly been implemented
and maintained to dilute the Indian vote and insure white control of county
government. Tribal members, represented by the ACLU, brought suit in 2003
alleging that the districting plan was malapportioned and had been drawn
purposefully to discriminate against Indian voters. The case was settled by a
consent decree in which the county admitted that its plan was discriminatory and
agreed to submit to federal supervision of its future plans under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act through January 2013.'5
VI. The Unsubmitted Voting Changes
A number of the voting changes which South Dakota enacted after it became
covered by Section 5, but which it refused to submit for preclearance, had the
potential for diluting Indian voting strength. One was authorization for
municipalities to adopt numbered seat requirements. A numbered seat
112. Emery v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 590, 597 (S.D. 2000).
113. Weddell v. Wagner Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 02-4056 (D.S.D. Mar. 18, 2003).
114. Wilcox v. City of Martin, No. 02-5021 (D.S.D.).
115. Kirkie v. Buffalo County, S.D., No. 03-3011 (D.S.D. Feb. 12, 2004).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
provision, as the Supreme Court has noted, disadvantages minorities because it
creates head-to-head contests and prevents a cohesive political group from
single-shot voting, or "concentrating on a single candidate."'"16 Another
unsubmitted change was the requirement of a majority vote for nomination in
primary elections for United States senate, congressman, and governor.",7 A
majority vote requirement can "significantly" decrease the electoral
opportunities of a racial minority by allowing the numerical majority to prevail
in all elections." 8 Still another voting change the state failed to submit was its
2001 legislative redistricting plan.
The 2001 plan divided the state into thirty-five legislative districts, each of
which elected one senator and two members of the house of representatives." 9
No doubt due to the litigation involving the 1996 plan, the legislature continued
the exception of using two subdistricts in District 28, one of which included the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation and a portion of the Standing Rock Indian
Reservation. The boundaries of the district that included Shannon and Todd
Counties, District 27, were altered only slightly under the 2001 plan, but the
demographic composition of the district was substantially changed. Indians were
87% of the population of District 27 under the 1991 plan, and the district was
one of the most underpopulated in the state. Under the 2001 plan, Indians were
90% of the population, while the district was one of the most overpopulated in
the state. As was apparent, Indians were more "packed," or over-concentrated,
in the new District 27 than under the 1991 plan. Had Indians been "unpacked,"
they could have been a majority in a house district in adjacent District 26.
Indeed, James Bradford, an Indian representative from District 27, proposed
an amendment reconfiguring Districts 26 and 27 that would have retained
District 27 as majority Indian and divided District 26 into two house districts,
one of which, District 26A, would have had an Indian majority. Bradford's
amendment was voted down fifty-one to sixteen. 20 Thomas Short Bull
criticized the way in which District 27 had been drawn because there were "just
too many Indians in that legislative district," which he said diluted the Indian
vote.' 2' Elsie Meeks, a tribal member at Pine Ridge and the first Indian to serve
on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, said that the plan "segregates Indians,"
and denies them equal voting power.
22
116. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 (1982).
117. Act of July 1, 1985, ch. 110, 1985 S.D. Laws 295.
118. City of Rome, Ga. v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183-84 (1980).
119. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-2-34 (Michie 2001).
120. Bone Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
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Despite enacting these admitted changes in voting - a new legislative plan
affecting Todd and Shannon Counties, which were covered by Section 5 - the
state refused to submit the 2001 plan for preclearance. Alfred Bone Shirt and
three other Indian residents from Districts 26 and 27, with the assistance of the
ACLU, sued the state in December 2001 for its failure to submit its redistricting
plan for preclearance. The plaintiffs also claimed that the plan unnecessarily
packed Indian voters in violation of Section 2 and deprived them of an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.
A three-judge court was convened to hear the plaintiffs' Section 5 claim. The
state argued that since district lines had not been significantly changed insofar
as they affected Shannon and Todd Counties, there was no need to comply with
Section 5. The three-judge court disagreed. It held that "demographic shifts
render the new District 27 a change 'in voting' for the voters of Shannon and
Todd counties that must be precleared under [Section] 5."123 The state submitted
the plan to the Attorney General, who precleared it, apparently concluding that
the additional packing of Indians in District 27 did not have a retrogressive
effect.
The district court, sitting as a single-judge court, heard plaintiffs' Section 2
claim and in a detailed 144-page opinion invalidated the state's 2001 legislative
plan as diluting Indian voting strength. The court found that Indians were
geographically compact and could constitute a majority in an additional House
district in the area of the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Indian Reservations. Indians
were politically cohesive, as a significant number of Indians usually voted for
the same candidates, shared common beliefs, ideals, and concerns, and had
organized themselves politically and in other areas. The court also found that
plaintiffs established the third Gingles factor, i.e., that whites voted as a bloc
usually to defeat the candidates favored by Indians. 2 n
Turning to the totality of circumstances analysis required by Section 2, the
court found there was "substantial evidence that South Dakota officially
excluded Indians from voting and holding office."' 25 Indians in recent times
have encountered numerous difficulties in obtaining registration cards from their
county auditors, whose behavior "ranged from unhelpful to hostile."' 26 Indians
involved in voter registration drives have regularly been accused of engaging in
voter fraud by local officials, and while the accusations have proved to be
123. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (D.S.D. 2002) (three-judge court).
124. Bone Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 987-1017.
125. id. at 1019.
126. Id. at 1025.
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unfounded, they have "intimidated Indian voters." '127 According to Dr. Dan
McCool, the director of the American West Center at the University of Utah and
an expert witness for the plaintiffs, the accusations of voter fraud were "part of
an effort to create a racially hostile and polarized atmosphere. It's based on
negative stereotypes, and I think it's a symbol of just how polarized politics are
in the state in regard to Indians and non-Indians."'
128
Following the 2002 elections, which saw a surge in Indian political activity,
the legislature passed laws that added additional requirements to voting,
including a law requiring photo identification at the polls. 129 Representative Van
Norman said that in passing the burdensome new photo requirement, "the
legislature was retaliating because the Indian vote was a big factor in new
registrants and a close senatorial race."' 3° During the legislative debate on a bill
that would have made it easier for Indians to vote, representatives made
comments that were openly hostile to Indian political participation. According
to one opponent of the bill, "I, in my heart, feel that this bill.., will encourage
those who we don't particularly want to have in the system." Alluding to Indian
voters, he said "I'm not sure we want that sort of person in the polling place."''
Bennett County did not comply with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act
enacted in 1975 requiring it to provide minority language assistance in voting
until prior to the 2002 elections, and only then because it was directed to do so
by the Department of Justice. 132
The district court also found that "[n]umerous reports and volumes of public
testimony document the perception of Indian people that they have been
discriminated against in various ways in the administration of justice."'33
Thomas Hennies, Chief of Police in Rapid City, has stated publically that "I
personally know that there is racism and there is discrimination and there are
prejudices among all people and that they're apparent in law enforcement."' 34
Don Holloway, the sheriff of Pennington County, concurred that prejudice and
the perception of prejudice in the community were "true or accurate
descriptions." '135




131. Id. (comments of Rep. Stanford Addelstein).
132. Id. at 1028.





VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
The court concluded that "Indians in South Dakota bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which
hinders their ability to participate effectively in the political process."' 36 There
was also "a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to
Indian concerns."' 137 Representative Van Norman noted that in the legislature
any bill that has "[alnything to do with Indians instantly is, in my experience
treated in a different way unless acceptable to all." "[W]hen it comes to issues
of race or discrimination," he said, "people don't want to hear that." One
member of the legislature even accused Van Norman of "being racist" for
introducing a bill requiring law enforcement officials to keep records of people
they pulled over for traffic stops. 138
Indians in South Dakota, as found by the district court, "have also been
subject to discrimination in lending."' 39 Monica Drapeau, a business owner in
Martin, said that she was unable to obtain a loan from the local Blackpipe State
Bank, even though other banks in the state readily loaned her money.'
Blackpipe was later sued by the United States and agreed to end its policy of
refusing to make secured loans subject to tribal court jurisdiction and agreed to
pay $125,000 to the victims of its lending policies.'4 '
Some of the most compelling testimony in the Bone Shirt case, and which
was credited by the district court, came from tribal members who recounted
"numerous incidents of being mistreated, embarrassed or humiliated by
whites." 142 Elsie Meeks, for example, told about her first exposure to the non-
Indian world and the fact "that there might be some people who didn't think well
of people from the reservation." When she and her sister enrolled in a
predominantly white school in Fall River County and were riding the bus,
"somebody behind us said.., the Indians should go back to the reservation.
And I mean I was fairly hurt by it... it was just sort of a shock to me." Meeks
said that there is a "disconnect between Indians and non-Indians" in the state.
"[W]hat most people don't realize is that many Indians, they experience this
racism in some form from non-Indians nearly every time they go into a border
town community.... [T]hen their ... reciprocal feelings are based on that, that
136. Id. at 1037.
137. Id. at 1046.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1031.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1032.
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they know, or at least feel that the non-Indians don't like them and don't trust
them."'
143
When Meeks was a candidate for lieutenant governor in 1998, she felt
welcome "in Sioux Falls and a lot of the East River communities." But in the
towns bordering the reservations, the reception "was more hostile." There, she
ran into "this whole notion that ... Indians shouldn't be allowed to run on the
statewide ticket and this perception by non-Indians that . . . we don't pay
property tax... that we shouldn't be allowed [to run for office.]"' 44 Such views
were expressed by a member of the state legislature who said that he would be
"leading the charge... to support Native American voting rights when Indians
decide to be citizens of the state by giving up tribal sovereignty and paying their
fair share of the tax burden."'
45
Craig Dillon, a tribal member living in Bennett County, told of his experience
playing on the varsity football team of the county high school. After practice,
members of the team would go to the home of the mayor's son for "fun and
games." The mayor, however, "interviewed" Dillon in his office to see if he was
"good enough" to be a friend of his son's. Dillon says that he flunked the
interview. "I guess I didn't measure up because ... I was the only one that
wasn't invited back to the house after football practice after that." He found the
experience to be "pretty demoralizing."'"
Monica Drapeau said that one of the reasons she didn't want to attend the
public school in Winner was because of the racial tension that existed there.
White students often called Indians "prairie niggers" and made other derogatory
comments. 147
Arlene Brandis, a tribal member at Rosebud, remembers walking to and from
school in Tripp County. "Cars would drive by and they would holler at us and
call us names... like dirty Indian, drunken Indian, and say why don't you go
back to the reservation.'
148
Lyla Young, who grew up in Parmalee, said that the first contact she had with
whites was when she went to high school in Todd County. The Indian students
lived in a segregated dorm at the Rosebud boarding school, and were bussed to
the high school, then bussed back to the dorm for lunch, then bused again to the
high school for the afternoon session. The white students referred to the Indian
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1035-36.
145. Id. at 1046.
146. Id. at 1032.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1033.
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students as "GI's," which stood for government issue. "I just withdrew. I had
no friends at school. Most of the girls that I dormed with didn't finish high
school .... I didn't associate with anybody," Young said. Even today, Young
has little contact with the white community. "I don't want to. I have no desire
to open up my life or my children's life to any kind of discrimination or harsh
treatment. Things are tough enough without inviting more." Testifying in court
was particularly difficult for her. 'This was a big job for me to come here
today .... I'm the only Indian woman in here, and I'm nervous. I'm very
uncomfortable."'49
The testimony of Young, Meeks, and the others illustrates the polarization
that continues to exist between the Indian and white communities in South
Dakota, which manifests itself in many ways, including in patterns of racially
polarized voting.
The district court, based upon proof of the three Gingles factors and the
totality of circumstances, concluded that the state's legislative plan violated
Section 2. Bryan Sells, the lead ACLU lawyer for the plaintiffs in Bone Shirt,
said that "no impartial observer of the political process in South Dakota could
reach a conclusion other than that of the district court, that the 2001 plan diluted
Indian voting strength."' °
As for the other six hundred odd unsubmitted voting changes, Elaine Quick
Bear Quiver and several other members of the Oglala and Rosebud Sioux Tribes
in Shannon and Todd Counties, and again represented by the ACLU's Voting
Rights Project, brought suit against the state in August 2002 to force it to
comply with Section 5. 5' Following negotiations among the parties, the court
entered a consent order in December 2002, in which it immediately enjoined
implementation of the numbered seat and majority vote requirements absent
preclearance, and directed the state to develop a comprehensive plan "that will
promptly bring the State into full compliance with its obligations under Section
5.'52 The state made its first submission in April 2003, and thus began a
process that is expected to take up to three years to complete.
Many jurisdictions in the South also failed to comply with Section 5 in the
years following their coverage. But in none was the failure so deliberate and
prolonged as in South Dakota.'53
149. Id.
150. Interview with Bryan Sells, staff attorney for ACLU's Voting Rights Project, in Atlanta,
Ga. (Sept. 28, 2004).
151. Quick Bear Quiver v. Hazeltine, No. 02-5069 (D.S.D. Dec. 27, 2002) (three-judge
court)..
152. Id., slip op. at 3.
153. For a discussion of noncompliance with Section 5 by covered jurisdictions in the South,
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VII. The "Reservation" Defense
The state conceded in the lawsuit over the 1996 interim redistricting plan that
Indians were not equal participants in elections in District 28, but argued that it
was the "reservation system" and "not the multimember district which is the
cause of [the] 'problem' identified by Plaintiffs."'" According to defendants,
Indians' loyalty was to tribal elections; they simply didn't care about
participating in elections run by the state. The argument overlooked the fact that
the state, by historically denying Indians the right to vote, had itself been
responsible for denying Indians the opportunity to develop a "loyalty" to state
elections. As the court concluded in Bone Shirt, "the long history of
discrimination against Indians has wrongfully denied Indians an equal
opportunity to get involved in the political process."'
155
Factually, however, defendants were incorrect. While Indian political
participation was undoubtedly depressed, Indians did care about state politics.
Indians were candidates for the House and Senate in 1992 and 1994, and
received overwhelming support from Indian voters. An Indian ran for Treasurer
of Dewey County in 1992 and received 100% of the Indian vote. Indians have
also run for and been elected to other offices in District 28A. If Indians didn't
care about state politics they would not have run for office nor would they have
supported the Indian candidates.
Undoubtedly, more Indians would have run for office had they believed that
the state system was fair and provided them a realistic chance of being elected.
As one court has explained, the lack of minority candidates "is a likely result of
a racially discriminatory system."'56 As another court has said, white bloc
voting "undoubtedly discourages [minority] candidates because they face the
certain prospect of defeat."'
157
The Cheyenne River Sioux have made a decision to conduct elections for the
Tribe and the state at the same time, a measure designed to increase Indian
participation in state elections, The Sisseton-Wahpeton litigation, the suits
brought by Indians in 1986 protesting the failure of county officials to provide
sufficient polling places for elections and voter registration cards, the challenge
see Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The
Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 62-67 (1983).
154. State Defendants' Response at 26, Emery v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 590, 597 (S.D. 2000)
(No. 00-3008).
155. Bone Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
156. McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
157. Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 632 (M.D. Ala. 1978).
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to the 1996 legislative redistricting, the Section 5 enforcement law suit, the
challenge to the 2001 redistricting plan, and the dilution claims filed in Charles
Mix County, the city of Martin, and Buffalo County further show that Indians
do care about participating in state and local elections.
The state's "reservation" defense was not new. An alleged lack of Indian
interest in state elections was also advanced as a defense by South Dakota in the
cases that involved denying residents of the unorganized counties the right to
vote or run for county office. In the first case, the state sought to justify denying
residents in unorganized counties the right to vote for officials in organized
counties on the ground that a majority of the residents were "reservation
Indians" who "do not share the same interest in county government as the
residents of the organized counties."' 158 The court rejected the defense, noting
that a claim that a particular class of voters lacks a substantial interest in local
elections should be viewed with "skepticism," because "'[a]ll too often, lack of
a 'substantial interest' might mean no more than a different interest, and
'[flencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way
they may vote."' The court concluded that Indians residing on the reservation
had a "substantial interest" in the choice of county officials, and held the state
scheme unconstitutional. 1
59
In the second case, the state argued that denying residents in unorganized
counties the right to run for office in organized counties was justifiable because
most of them lived on an "Indian Reservation and hence have little, if any,
interest in county government."'' Again, the court disagreed. It held that the
"presumption" that Indians lacked a substantial interest in county elections "is
not a reasonable one."'
16 1
The "reservation" defense has been raised - and rejected - in other voting
cases brought by Native Americans in the West. In a suit by Crow and Northern
Cheyenne in Big Horn County, Montana, the county argued that Indian dual
sovereignty, not at-large voting, was the cause of reduced Indian participation
in county politics. The court disagreed, noting that Indians had run for office in
recent years and were as concerned about issues relating to their welfare as
white voters. According to the court, "[r]acially polarized voting and the effects
of past and present discrimination explain the lack of Indian political influence
in the county, far better than existence of tribal government." 62
158. Little Thunder, 518 F.2d at 1255.
159. Id. at 1256.
160. United States v. South Dakota, 636 F.2d at 244.
161. Id. at 245.
162. Windy Boy, 647 F. Supp. at 1021.
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Similarly, in a case in Montezuma County, Colorado, the court found that
Indian participation in elections was depressed and noted "the reticence of the
Native American population of Montezuma County to integrate into the non-
Indian population."' 63 But instead of counting this "reticence" against a finding
of vote dilution, the court concluded that it was "an obvious outgrowth of the
discrimination and mistreatment of the Native Americans in the past."'"
Further, in a case from Montana involving Indians in Blaine County, most of
whom resided on the Fort Belknap Reservation, the court rejected the argument
that low voter participation was a defense to a vote dilution claim. The court
reasoned that:
if low voter turnout could defeat a section 2 claim, excluded
minority voters would find themselves in a vicious cycle: their
exclusion from the political process would increase apathy, which in
turn would undermine their ability to bring a legal challenge to the
discriminatory practices, which would perpetuate low voter turnout,
and so on.' 65
South Dakota's claims that Indians didn't care about state politics was familiar
for another reason. It was virtually identical to the argument that whites in the
South made in an attempt to defeat challenges brought by blacks to election
systems that diluted black voting strength. "It's not the method of elections,"
they said in cases from Arkansas to Mississippi, "black voters are just
apathetic." But as the court held in a case from Marengo County, Alabama,
"[b]oth Congress and the courts have rejected efforts to blame reduced black
participation on 'apathy."" '  The real cause of the depressed level of political
participation by blacks in Marengo County was:
racially polarized voting; a nearly complete absence of black elected
officials; a history of pervasive discrimination that has left Marengo
County blacks economically, educationally, socially, and politically
disadvantaged; polling practices that have impaired the ability of
blacks to register and participate actively in the electoral process;
election features that enhance the opportunity for dilution; and
considerable unresponsiveness on the part of some public bodies.' 67
163. Cuthair v. Montezuma-Cortez, Colo. Sch. Dist. No. RE-I, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1161
(D. Colo. 1998).
164. Id.
165. United States v. Blaine County, Mont., 363 F.3d 897, 911 (9th Cir. 2004).
166. United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1568 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
167. Id. at 1574.
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The court could have been writing about Indians in South Dakota.
In a case from Mississippi, the court rejected a similar "apathy" defense.
"Voter apathy," it said, "is not a matter for judicial notice."'" According to the
court, "[t]he considerable evidence of the socioeconomic differences between
black and white voters in Attala County argues against the.., reiteration that
black voter apathy is the reason for generally lower black political
participation."'' 69 It is convenient and reassuring for a jurisdiction to blame the
victims of discrimination for their condition, but it is not a defense to a challenge
under Section 2.
The basic purpose of the Voting Rights Act is "to banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting."'70 To argue, as South Dakota and other states have
frequently done, that the depressed levels of minority political participation
preclude a claim under Section 2 would reward jurisdictions with the worst
records of discrimination by making them the most secure from challenge under
the act. Congress could not have intended such an inappropriate result. In
Gingles the Court said that:
The essence of a [Section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral law,
practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions
to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives. 7 '
There can be no serious doubt that social and historical conditions, whatever
their causes, have created a condition under which at-large voting and other
election practices dilute the voting strength of Indian voters.
VIII. Conclusion
The history of voting rights in South Dakota strongly supports the extension
of the special provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and demonstrates the wisdom
of Congress in making permanent and nationwide the basic guarantee of equal
political participation contained in the Act. Unfortunately, however, the
difficulties Indians experience in participating effectively in state and local
168. Teague v. Attala County, Miss., 92 F.3d 283, 295 (5th Cir. 1996).
169. Id. at 294. Other courts have similarly rejected "apathy" as the cause for low minority
voter political participation. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Democratic Party of State of Ark., 890 F.2d
1423, 1431 (8th Cir. 1989); Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss., 554 F.2d
139, 145, & n.13 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the apathy defense and listing past discrimination,
socioeconomic disparities, and bloc voting as causes for nonregistration).
170. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
171. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
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politics and electing candidates of their choice are not restricted to South
Dakota. A variety of common factors have coalesced to isolate Indian voters
from the political mainstream throughout the West: past discrimination,
polarized voting, overt hostility of white public officials, cultural and language
barriers, a depressed socioeconomic status, inability to finance campaigns,
difficulties in establishing coalitions with white voters, a lack of faith in the state
system, and conflicts with non-Indians over issues such as water rights, taxation,
and tribal jurisdiction.
President Nixon, in a special message to congress in 1970, gave a grim
assessment of the status of Native Americans in the United States:
The First Americans - the Indians - are the most deprived and
most isolated minority group in our nation. On virtually every scale
of measurement - employment, income, education, health - the
condition of the Indian people ranks at the bottom.
This condition is the heritage of centuries of injustice. From the
time of their first contact with European settlers, the American
Indians have been oppressed and brutalized, deprived of their
ancestral lands and denied the opportunity to control their own
destiny. '
Recent voting rights litigation in South Dakota and other western states shows
that the conditions described by President Nixon have not been significantly
ameliorated.
In a recent suit invalidating at-large elections in Montezuma County,
Colorado, brought by residents of the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation, for
example, the court found: a "history of discrimination - social, economic, and
political, including official discrimination by the state and federal government;"
a "strong" pattern of racially polarized voting; depressed Indian political
participation; a "depressed socio-economic status of Native Americans;" and a
lack of Indian elected officials.
73
In a case from Nebraska involving Omaha and Winnebago Indians, the court
found "legally significant" white bloc voting, a "lack of success achieved by
Native American candidates," that Indians "bear the effects of social, economic,
and educational discrimination," that Indians had a "depressed level of political
172. President's Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, Pun. PAPERS: RICHARD
NLXON 564-67, 575-76 (1970).
173. Cuthair, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70.
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participation," there was a lack of "interaction" between Indians and whites, and
there was "overt and subtle discrimination in the community."' 74
In another case brought by residents of the Crow and Northern Cheyenne
Reservations in Montana, the court found "recent interference with the right of
Indians to vote," "the polarized nature of campaigns," "official acts of
discrimination that have interfered with the rights of Indian citizens to register
and to vote," "a strong desire on the part of some white citizens to keep Indians
out of Big Horn County government," polarized "voting patterns," the
continuing "effects on Indians of being frozen out of county government," and
a depressed socioeconomic status that makes it "more difficult for Indians to
participate in the political process."'
As is apparent, the "inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to
vestigal effects of past purposeful discrimination," and which the Voting Rights
Act was designed to eradicate, still persist throughout the West.'76 The Voting
Rights Act, including the special preclearance requirement of Section 5, are still
urgently needed in Indian Country. Of all the modem legislation enacted to
redress the problems facing American Indians,'77 the Voting Rights Act provides
the most effective means of advancing the goals of self-development and self-
determination that are central to the survival and prosperity of the Indian
community in the United States.
IX. Addendum: The Voting Rights Act of 1965: What Expires in 2007 and
What Does Not
A. What Does Not Expire
1. The Ban on "Tests or Devices," 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa
The Voting Rights Act'78 bans the use of any "test or device" for registering
or voting in any federal, state, or local election. A "test or device" includes
literacy, understanding, or interpretation tests, educational or knowledge
requirements, good character tests, proof of qualifications by "vouchers" from
third parties, or registration procedures or elections conducted solely in English
174. Stabler, 129 F.3d at 1023.
175. Windy Boy, 647 F. Supp. at 1016, 1022.
176. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 69.
177. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203 (1975); Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400
(1976); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978);
Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (2000).
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where a single language minority comprises more than 5% of the voting age
population of the jurisdiction. 179 "Language minorities" are defined as American
Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and those of Spanish heritage. 80
The ban on tests or devices is nationwide and permanent.
2. The "Results" Standard of Section 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act'8 ' prohibits the use of any voting
procedure or practice which "results" in a denial or abridgement of the right to
vote on account of race or color or membership in a language minority. Section
2 applies nationwide and is permanent.
3. Voter Assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6
By amendment in 1982, the Voting Rights Act 82 provides that any voter who
requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read
or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice, other than the
voter's employer or union. The voter assistance provision is nationwide and
permanent.
4. Court Appointment of Federal Examiners, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a
In any action to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendments a court may, pursuant to Section 3 (a) of the Act,'83 appoint federal
examiners to register voters. The federal examiner provision is nationwide and
permanent, although it is rarely, if ever, used today.
5. Civil and Criminal Penalties, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973i and 1973j
Sections 11 and 12 of the Act 84 authorize the imposition of civil and criminal
sanctions on those who interfere with the right to vote, fail to comply with the
Act, or commit voter fraud. These provisions are permanent and nationwide.
6. Pocket Trigger, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c)
Section 3(c) of the Act,'85 the so-called "pocket trigger," requires a court
which has found a violation of voting rights protected by the fourteenth or
179. Id. § 1973b(c), (f)(3).
180. Id. § 1973aa-la(e).
181. Id. § 1973.
182. Id. § 1973aa-6.
183. Id. § 1973a.
184. Id. §§ 1973i, 1973j.
185. Id. § 1973a(c).
[Vol. 29
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss1/2
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
fifteenth amendments as part of any equitable relief to require a jurisdiction for
an "appropriate" period of time to preclear its proposed new voting practices or
procedures. The preclearance process provided for in § 1973a(c) is similar to
that described in the discussion below of Section 5 of the Act. 186 There is no
expiration date for the pocket trigger.
7. Presidential Elections, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1
By amendments in 1970,187 Section 202 of the Act abolished durational
residency requirements and established uniform standards for absentee voting
in presidential elections. These provisions are permanent and nationwide.
B. What Does Expire
1. Section 4 Coverage Formula, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b
Section 4(b) of the Act 188 contains a formula defining jurisdictions subject to,
or "covered" by, special remedial provisions of the Act. The special provisions
are discussed below. Jurisdictions are covered if they used a "test or device" for
voting and less than half of voting age residents were registered or voted in the
1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential elections. Coverage is determined by the
attorney general and the director of the census, and is not judicially reviewable.
Coverage, and with it the application of the special provisions, is set to expire
in August 2007.
2. Section 5 Preclearance, 42 U.S. C. § 1973c
Section 5,189 known as the "preclearance" requirement, is one of the special
provisions of Act whose application is triggered by the coverage formula in
Section 4(b). Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to get approval, or
preclearance, from federal authorities (either the attorney general or the federal
court for the District of Columbia) prior to implementing any changes in their
voting laws or procedures. The jurisdiction has the burden of proving that a
proposed change does not have the purpose and would not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or membership
in a language minority. Jurisdictions covered by Section 5 are: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California (5 counties), Florida (5 counties), Georgia,
Louisiana, Michigan (2 towns), Mississippi, New Hampshire (10 towns), New
186. Id. § 1973c.
187. Id. § 1973aa-1.
188. Id. § 1973b(b).
189. Id. § 1973c.
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York (3 counties), North Carolina (40 counties), South Carolina, South Dakota
(2 counties), Texas, Virginia. U.S. Department of Justice, Section 5 Covered
Jurisdictions (Jan. 28, 2002). Section 5, unless extended, will expire in August
2007.
3. Assignment of Federal Examiners and Poll Watchers by the Attorney
General, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d, e, f & k
The attorney general can assign federal examiners to covered jurisdictions
pursuant to Sections 6(b), 7, 9, and 13(a) of the Act,"9 to list qualified
applicants who are thereafter entitled to vote in all elections. The attorney
general is also authorized by Section 8 of the Act 9 ' to appoint federal poll-
watchers in places to which federal examiners have been assigned. These
provisions are set to expire in August 2007.
4. Bilingual Voting Materials Requirement, 42 U.S. C. § 1973aa-1a
Certain states and political subdivisions are required by 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-
la to provide voting materials in languages other than English. While there are
several tests for "coverage," the requirement is imposed upon jurisdictions with
significant language minority populations who are limited-English proficient and
where the illiteracy rate of the language minority is higher than the national
illiteracy rate. Covered jurisdictions are required to furnish voting materials in
the language of the applicable minority group as well as in English.
Jurisdictions required to provide bilingual election procedures for one or more
language minorities include the entire states of California, New Mexico, and
Texas, and several hundred counties and townships in Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. 92 The
bilingual voting materials requirement is scheduled to expire in August 2007.
190. Id. § 1973d, e, k.
191. Id. § 1973f.
192. 67 Fed. Reg. 48,872 (July 26, 2002).
[Vol. 29
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss1/2
